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INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District 1 in 1969, courts
have applied a unique free speech standard to students in public
schools. While famously declaring that students do not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,” 2 the Court added that student speech that
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder” is
subject to discipline. 3 Tinker did not intend to apply a material
disruption standard to speech generally. Subsequent opinions
make clear that the standard is unique to students in public
schools. 4 To apply Tinker, then, courts must first resolve the
“threshold issue” of whether the speech occurred inside or outside
of school. 5 Traditionally, this was a simple task. Although some
courts struggled with “underground newspapers” prepared offcampus and later brought into school, 6 the analysis still focused
primarily on the in-school activity. Student Internet speech renders
this threshold question more difficult. As Internet use continues to
grow in popularity among school-aged adolescents, courts are
A PDF version of this Note is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2941. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2009; B.A., Brandeis
University, 2005. I would like to thank Professor Abner Greene for his insightful
comments and for supervising the drafting of this Note. I would also like to thank
Professor James Fleming for introducing me to constitutional law in general and First
Amendment law specifically.
1
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2
Id. at 506.
3
Id. at 513.
4
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“[T]he First
Amendment rights of students in the public schools ‘are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings.’” (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986))).
5
J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002)
6
See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir.
1998); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987); Thomas v. Bd. of
Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979); see also infra
Part II.A.
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called upon to determine whether web activity may constitute oncampus speech for First Amendment purposes. In other words, can
the schoolhouse gate extend online?
Digital technology, particularly the Internet, permeates almost
every aspect of the modern adolescent’s life. 7 Eighty-seven
percent of young adults between ages twelve and seventeen use the
Internet regularly. 8 Ninety-three percent have used it at some
point. 9 Of middle- and high-school aged adolescents who use the
Internet, more than half use online social networking websites, 10
such as MySpace 11 and Facebook. 12 Studies show that almost half
of social-network users log in to the network at least once a day. 13
Notably, adolescents use the Internet most frequently at home or at
school. 14 They often use the Internet to publish original material
as well. 15 Weblog software, such as Blogger, 16 makes it easy for
anybody to create and maintain a regularly updated website
featuring a wide variety of content.

7

See The Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006: Hearing on H.R. 5319 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Amanda Lenhart, Senior Research Specialist, Pew
Internet & American Life Project).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITE AND TEENS: AN OVERVIEW 1 (Jan. 3, 2007),
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_SNS_Data_Memo_Jan_2007.pdf; see also Dana
Boyd, Why Youth [Heart] Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in
Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 123 (David
Buckingham ed., 2008) (“Social network sites are based around profiles . . . which offer[]
a description of each member. . . . [T]he social network site profile also contains
comments from other members, and a public list of the people that one identifies as
Friends within the network.”).
11
MySpace, http://www.myspace.com.
12
Facebook, http://www.facebook.com.
13
LENHART & MADDEN, supra note 10, at 2.
14
Id. at 4–5.
15
See Student Press Law Center, SPLC Cyberguide: A Legal Manual for Online
Publishers of Independent Student Websites, http://splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=13.
16
Blogger, http://www.blogger.com.
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The near universal access and use of the Internet among
school-aged adolescents coupled with the tremendous ease of
creating original expression and distributing that expression makes
the legal question addressed in this Note a crucial one. When
Justice Fortas spoke for the Court in Tinker, he undoubtedly did
not envision school authorities censoring what students say to each
other outside of school in local hangouts. Today, however, what
students say to each other outside school is often broadcast online
and may thereby end up on campus. As the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania noted, “Tinker’s simple armband . . . has been
replaced by [a] complex multimedia web site, accessible to fellow
students, teachers, and the world.” 17
This Note examines how courts have struggled to apply the
traditional student speech precedents to online speech. Part I
summarizes the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding student
speech rights. Part II discusses how courts have applied these
cases when the speech at issue originates off-campus. Part III
argues that the analytical approach used in J.S. ex rel H.S. v.
Bethlehem Area School District 18 and Layshock v. Hermitage
School District 19 appropriately balances student free speech and
the necessary disciplinary functions of school authorities.

17

J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002).
J.S., 807 A.2d 847.
19
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007), appeal
denied, 2007 WL 3120192 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2007).
18
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I. RESTRICTING STUDENT SPEECH: THE SEMINAL CASES
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District 20
In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines, Iowa
decided to protest the Vietnam War “by wearing black armbands
during the holiday season and by fasting on December 16 and New
Year’s Eve.” 21 The principals of the local schools learned of the
plan and adopted a policy requiring any student wearing an
armband to school to remove it or face suspension. 22 Three
students nevertheless wore the armbands to school and were
suspended. 23 They brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an
injunction against the policy and for nominal damages. 24 The
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected the
students’ conduct, famously declaring that students do not “shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.” 25
The speech at issue in Tinker was “a silent, passive expression
of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance.” 26
There was no evidence that the students’ protest interfered in any
way with the rights of other students. 27 The District Court, though,
concluded that the school authorities behaved reasonably in
suspending the students because they feared it would cause a
disturbance. 28
The Supreme Court responded that
20

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see generally
Aaron Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet
Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 120–43 (2003) (carefully examining the facts at
issue in Tinker, including a close reading of the District Court and Court of Appeals
decisions).
21
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 506.
26
Id. at 508.
27
Id.
28
Id.
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“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” 29
Any departure from absolute regimentation may
cause trouble. Any variation from the majority’s
opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in
class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that
deviates from the views of another person may start
an argument or cause a disturbance. But our
Constitution says we must take this risk. 30
The Court emphasized that “state-operated schools may not be
enclaves of totalitarianism” and students must be permitted to
express views that run counter to what is “officially approved.” 31
Students are free to express their opinions, however controversial,
so long as they do so “without ‘materially and substantially
interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights of
others.” 32 Student conduct that “materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others” is
not protected by the First Amendment and thus may be restricted
by school authorities. 33
B. From Fraser to Morse
The Court continued its effort to apply the First Amendment
“in light of the special characteristics of the school environment” 34
in Bethel School District No. 402 v. Fraser 35 and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 36 two cases in which the Court
carved out exceptions to Tinker’s material disruption analysis.

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id.
Id. (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)).
Id. at 511.
Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
Id.
Id. at 506.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 402 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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More recently, in Morse v. Frederick, 37 the Court held that
students may be disciplined for advocating drug use. 38
Mathew Fraser, a student at Bethel High School, delivered a
speech nominating a fellow student for a student government
position at a school-sponsored assembly. In the speech, he
“referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor.” 39 A school disciplinary rule provided
that “conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the
educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene,
profane language or gestures.” 40 The school determined that
Fraser’s speech violated this rule; accordingly, he was suspended
for three days and his name removed from a list of candidates to
speak at graduation. 41
The Court emphasized “that the constitutional rights of
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings.” 42 This is partially due to the
school’s unique function, which is to “inculcate the habits and
manners of civility.” 43 It is appropriate, then, for a school to
determine that the essential lessons of civility cannot be taught in
an atmosphere where lewd, indecent, or offensive speech takes
place. 44 Considering the offensive nature of Fraser’s speech, 45 the
Court determined that the school was within its rights to punish
it. 46

37

Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
Id. at 2623–29.
39
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78.
40
Id. at 678.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 682.
43
Id. at 681 (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). But cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)
(criticizing “[t]he desire of the Legislature to foster a homogeneous people with
American ideals”).
44
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
45
Id. (“The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser’s speech was plainly offensive to both
teachers and students—indeed to any mature person.”).
46
Id. at 685.
38
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The Court has since expressed ambivalence regarding Fraser’s
analysis 47 and a more thorough discussion of the case is beyond
the scope of this Note. In Morse, the Court gleaned two basic
principles from Fraser: First, “that ‘the constitutional rights of
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings’ . . . [and] second, . . . that the
mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.” 48
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier addressed a school
newspaper published as part of a journalism class. 49 The school’s
principal objected to two of the articles set to appear in the next
issue. 50 One described students’ experiences with pregnancy; the
other discussed the impact of divorce on students at school. 51
Following its decision in Fraser, the Court noted that “[a] school
need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic
educational mission,’ even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside school.” 52 The Court distinguished
Tinker by noting that Tinker addressed whether a school must
tolerate particular student speech, whereas here the issue was
whether a school must affirmatively promote particular student
speech. 53 Regarding this second form of student speech, the Court
held that schools may “exercis[e] editorial control over the style
and content . . . so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”54
47

See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (“The mode of analysis
employed in Fraser is not entirely clear.”).
48
Id. at 2626–27.
49
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
50
Id. at 263.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 402 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
53
Id. at 270–71. In evaluating whether the newspaper constituted school-sponsored
speech, the Court noted that the newspaper was written and edited by students in a
journalism class which was paid for by the Board of Education, and for which the
students received academic credit. Id. at 262–63, 268.
54
Id. at 273. The Court suggested that a school may censor offensive student speech
in a school-sponsored publication in the same way that it may censor “speech that is . . .
ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or
profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.” Id. at 271–72.
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More recently, in Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court
brought Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier to bear on a case involving
a student displaying a banner bearing the phrase: “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS.” 55 Joseph Frederick unfurled the banner across the street
from the school as students gathered to watch the Olympic torch
relay pass through the city. 56 When Frederick failed to take down
the banner at Principal Morse’s request, he was suspended for ten
days. 57 Morse later explained her decision, saying she told
Frederick to remove the banner because it “encouraged illegal drug
use.” 58 The Court reasoned that the banner may, in fact,
“reasonably [be] regarded as promoting illegal drug use,” and thus
held that the school did not violate Frederick’s First Amendment
rights by confiscating it. 59
In dicta, the Court emphasized the unique role of public
education and what that means for students’ rights. 60 For example,
the Court noted that, in the Fourth Amendment context, the nature
of students’ rights “is what is appropriate for children in school.” 61
Accordingly, “some easing of the restrictions” regarding searches

55

Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007). Although the Court noted that
Kuhlmeier did not control, it considered the case “instructive” because it “acknowledged
that schools may regulate some speech ‘even though the government could not censor
similar speech outside the school.’” Id. at 2627 (quoting Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266).
Strictly speaking, the Court’s holding in Morse is best understood as a categorical
exception to Tinker.
56
Id. at 2622. The Court rejected Frederick’s argument that this was not a school
speech case, on grounds the event occurred during school hours and was sanctioned by
Morse “as an approved social event.” Id. at 2624. It acknowledged that “[t]here is some
uncertainty . . . as to when courts should apply school-speech precedents,” but this case
was clear. Id.
57
Id. at 2622.
58
Id. at 2622–23. The school superintendent upheld the principal’s decision,
explaining that the phrase “bong hits” typically refers to “a means of smoking
marijuana.” Id. at 2623.
59
Id. at 2622.
60
Id. at 2627.
61
Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995)).
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is required. 62 This difference of standard apparently stems from
“the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.” 63
The Morse Court had occasion to offer guidance on the issue of
off-campus speech. 64 Frederick argued that the school lacked
authority to discipline him because his speech occurred off school
property. 65 The Court, however, did not address this issue in
detail. It stated, without much discussion, that the event was a
school-sanctioned activity and thus, should be analyzed under the
traditional student-speech cases. 66
II. RESTRICTING SPEECH ORIGINATING OFF-CAMPUS
A. Off-Campus Speech Generally
Recall the Supreme Court’s famous pronouncement that
students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” 67 What happens
when the speech originates outside the schoolhouse gate but
nonetheless causes the kind of disruption that, had it occurred oncampus, could be regulated under Tinker? The lack of a Supreme
Court decision on this point makes this a difficult question, and
courts struggle to determine the off-campus reach of school
authority. In this section this Note surveys a number of cases
dealing with the regulation of off-campus speech. This Note
demonstrates that courts lack a consistent doctrinal analysis for
62

Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)).
Id. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656); see also id. at 2638 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (basing the unique public school free-speech standards “on some special
characteristic of the school setting” which “in this case was the threat to the physical
safety of students”).
64
See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age 22 (B.C. Legal
Stud. Res. Paper No. 149, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112789.
65
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
66
Id.; Papandrea, supra note 64, at 23 (suggesting that the Court’s “tremendous
deference” to the school’s interpretation here indicates an erosion of student speech
rights).
67
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
63
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establishing the borders of school authority over off-campus
speech, which is only made worse in the online-speech context.
A word on methodology is in order. This Note’s author’s
interest in the cases discussed in this and the following sections
lies in how they address (or avoid) the jurisdictional question of
what constitutes on-campus speech. Thus, in discussing these
cases, this Note focuses (sometimes exclusively) on their treatment
of the jurisdictional question rather than on their holdings. If a
court concludes that the speech is on-campus, how it then applies
Tinker or Fraser certainly influences the debate. This point is
addressed further in Part III. Nonetheless, the more important
issue for the purposes of this Note is how to determine the
boundaries of the schoolhouse gate.
In Klein v. Smith, 68 the court addressed the issue of whether a
student may be disciplined for making a vulgar gesture to a teacher
outside of school and after school hours. 69 The student was
suspended for ten days after the incident under a rule providing
disciplinary measures for “vulgar or extremely inappropriate
language or conduct directed to a staff member.” 70 The court
reasoned that Klein’s speech was sufficiently off-campus for
purposes of Tinker and that his suspension violated his First
Amendment rights. 71
The conduct in question occurred in a restaurant
parking lot, far removed from any school premises
or facilities, at a time when the teacher, Clark, was
not associated in any way with his duties as a
teacher. The student was not engaged in any school
activity or associated in any way with school
premises or his role as a student. Any possible

68

Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 1986).
Id. at 1440. Defendant argued that “Plaintiff’s gesture had no . . . expressive content
and is, therefore, not ‘speech’ entitled to First Amendment protection.” Id. at 1441 n.2.
The court rejected this argument. Id.
70
Id. at 1441.
71
Id. at 1442.
69
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connection between his act of “giving the finger” to
a person who happens to be one of his teachers and
the proper and orderly operation of the school’s
activities is . . . far too attenuated to support
discipline against Klein for violating the rule
prohibiting vulgar or discourteous conduct toward a
teacher. 72
The court does not present any sweeping standards or rules for
determining what level of involvement with school activity was
necessary to render Klein’s gesture punishable. The factors
considered in the above-quoted passage merely suggest that this
was not a close call. Importantly though, the court’s jurisdictional
analysis suggests that the mere fact that Klein’s gesture occurred
outside the physical property of the school did not automatically
protect him from school discipline.73
In Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Center School
District, 74 the Second Circuit stated that although educators “must
be accorded substantial discretion” to execute their responsibilities,
their “authority does not reach beyond the schoolhouse gate.” 75
The speech at issue was a satirical newspaper, entitled Hard Times,
that was published and distributed off school grounds, but
addressed to the school community. 76
It featured articles
“pasquinading school lunches, cheerleaders, classmates, and
teachers.” 77 Articles on masturbation and prostitution were also
included. 78 When Hard Times surfaced in the school, a teacher
confiscated it and presented it to the principal, who, in consultation
72

Id. at 1441 (emphasis added). The court also noted that the gesture did not
constitute “fighting words.” Id. at 1442.
73
The court emphasized that the restaurant parking lot was far from school and that the
activity was not associated with school premises. Id. The court had the opportunity to
draw a bright-line rule, stating that since the conduct occurred outside of school property,
the school had no right to discipline Klein; it refrained from doing so.
74
Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
75
Id. at 1044–45.
76
Id. at 1045.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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with the superintendent and the Board of Education, imposed a
number of penalties on the students involved. 79
In analyzing whether the publication constituted on-campus
speech, the court observed that it was neither printed in school nor
sold in school. 80 Although “a few articles were transcribed on
school typewriters, and . . . the finished product was secretly and
unobtrusively stored in a teacher’s closet,” the court emphasized
that it “was conceived, executed, and distributed outside the
school.” 81 Any on-campus activity was therefore de minimis. 82
The court stressed that “because school officials have ventured out
of the school yard and into the general community where the
freedom accorded expression is at its zenith,” 83 their “power must
be cabined within the rigorous confines of the First
Amendment.” 84
In Bystrom v. Fridley High School, 85 the Eighth Circuit opined
on the status of an “underground newspaper.” 86 Here, students
distributed a publication on school grounds that school officials
deemed violative of a number of policies. 87 Specifically, school
policy prohibited “pervasively indecent or vulgar” writings and
writings “that invade the privacy of another.” 88 The court
ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the school policies,
holding that the school was within its rights to discipline the
offending students. 89 In dicta, however, the court offered a caveat
that will prove crucial for this Note’s purposes:
79
Id. at 1045–46. The penalties included: (1) a five-day suspension; (2) segregation
from others during study hall; (3) loss of student privileges; and (4) inclusion of
suspension letters in the students’ files. Id. at 1046.
80
Id. at 1050.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1045.
85
Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987).
86
Id. at 749.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 750.
89
Id. at 755.
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Only distribution “on school property” is at issue
here. The school district asserts no authority to
govern or punish what students say, write, or
publish to each other or to the public at any location
outside the school buildings and grounds. If school
authorities were to claim such a power, quite
different issues would be raised, and the burden of
the authorities to justify their policy under the First
Amendment would be much greater, perhaps even
insurmountable. 90
In Boucher v. School Board of Greenfield, 91 the Seventh
Circuit declined to follow Thomas and the Bystrom dicta. 92 The
“underground newspaper” at issue was entitled The Last. 93 Its
inaugural issue “provocatively explained that [it] was intended to
‘ruffle a few feathers.’” 94 The issue distributed on June 4, 1997
included an article entitled, So You Want to Be A Hacker, which
provided detailed instructions on how to break into the school
computer network. 95 Although written pseudonymously, it was
soon determined that the author was Justin Boucher, a student at
Greenfield High School. 96 Boucher was suspended and the School
Board subsequently voted to expel him. 97
Boucher argued, inter alia, that “school officials’ authority over
off-campus expression is much more limited than it is over
expression on school grounds[,]” citing Bystrom and Thomas. 98
The court dismissed the reference to Bystrom as “merely
dictum.” 99 Regarding Thomas, the court suggested that the Second
Circuit’s holding was based on the fact that the speech at issue
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 750.
Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 828.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 829.
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“lacked the potential to disrupt school activities.” 100 The Thomas
Court declined to consider a hypothetical case “in which a group of
students incites substantial disruption within the school from some
remote locale” because, on the facts before it, “there was simply no
threat or forecast of material and substantial disruption within the
school.” 101 The Seventh Circuit similarly limited its holding to the
specific facts of the case. 102
B. Internet Speech and the Search for a New Standard
This section discusses a number of recent cases and scholarly
articles that struggle with the First Amendment rights of middleand high school students on the Internet. As mentioned in the
Introduction, the pervasive quality of the Internet makes this issue
much more difficult than the underground newspaper cases
surveyed above. In those cases, courts could at least take for
granted that on-campus speech was speech either originating on or
brought onto school property. In the online context, speech
originating in the privacy of one’s home is automatically brought
into the school by the mere fact that modern classrooms and school
libraries provide Internet access. One option for courts is to simply
apply the school-speech standards across the board for all student
online speech on the rationale that any blog, Facebook profile, or
MySpace page are, by their nature, accessible on campus. Courts
are rightly resistant to such a sweeping limitation of student speech
rights. 103 On the other hand, online speech can have the same
disruptive effect inside the school walls as the on-campus speech
100

Id. at 828.
Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir.
1979). As we see in the following sections, this is precisely the scenario that the online
speech cases present.
102
Boucher, 124 F.3d at 829 (noting that since the article was in fact brought on
campus, the court need not consider the hypothetical situation envisioned in Thomas).
The court added that the article advocated on-campus activity. Id.
103
See Layshock v. Hermitage, 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (W.D. Pa. 2007), appeal
denied, 2007 WL 3120192 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2007) (“The mere fact that the [I]nternet
may be accessed at school does not authorize school officials to become censors of the
world-wide web.”).
101
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that is typically unprotected. It is reasonable, then, to afford
schools at least some discretion to discipline students for truly
disruptive speech, even if that speech originates online, from a
home computer. The difficult issue is, of course, where to draw
the line.
The off-campus speech cases 104 discussed above provide little
more than confusion and ambivalence. The Klein court merely
presented a list of factors, concluding that the relationship between
the speech at issue and school activity was “far too attenuated to
support discipline.” 105 The court’s failure to draw a bright line or
explain what degree of association with the school would have
permitted its disciplinary measures renders it of little help to future
courts. The court in Thomas is more helpful in this regard in that it
plainly states that school officials’ “authority does not reach
beyond the schoolhouse gate.” 106 This seems to imply that when
the activity takes place largely off-campus, it is subject to full First
Amendment protection. Yet, the court subtly resisted this
inference by declining to consider whether a school may discipline
students for “incit[ing] substantial disruption . . . from some
remote locale,” 107 i.e. the Internet.
The Bystrom court’s statement in dicta is more helpful but still
not conclusive. It suggested that if the school asserted “authority
to govern or punish what students say, write, or publish . . . outside
the school building and grounds,” it would raise “quite different
issues.” 108 In the cases discussed below, courts wrestle these very
issues. 109

104

“Off-campus” is used here loosely, recognizing that the extent to which the speech
occurred off- or on-campus was the very issue in these cases.
105
Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441 (D. Me. 1986); see supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
106
Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1044–45; see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
107
Id. at 1052 n.17; see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
108
Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1987); see supra note 86
and accompanying text.
109
The case law on this issue is presented chronologically, rather than attempting to
group the cases as more restrictive or less restrictive.
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When Brandon Beussink was a student at Woodland High
School, he created a website from his home computer that was
“highly critical” of the school administration. 110 The site used
“vulgar language” and contained a hyperlink to the school’s
official website. 111 Another student showed the website to a
teacher, who then informed the principal. 112 The principal
suspended Beussink for five days and later increased it to ten
days. 113 He testified that “he made the decision to discipline
Beussink immediately upon viewing the homepage . . . before he
knew whether any other students had seen or even had knowledge
of [it].” 114 Although the court stressed the off-campus nature of
Beussink’s website, 115 it applied Tinker’s material and substantial
interference test, stating that “Beussink’s homepage did not
materially and substantially interfere with school discipline.”116
The court did not address whether the website could be considered
off-campus speech and, thus subject to full First Amendment
protection. 117
In Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415, 118 Nick Emmett, a
student at Kentlake High School posted a website entitled the
“Unofficial Kentlake High Home Page.” 119 The website contained
“mock obituaries” of fellow students and had a feature allowing
110

Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
The court emphasized that Beussink did not use school facilities or resources to create the
site. It was created with his home computer, not during school hours. Id.
111
Id. at 1177 n.1. There was no hyperlink from the school’s page back to Beussink’s
page. Id.
112
Id. at 1177–78. The court noted Beussink did not give out the internet address of his
homepage to the fellow student who displayed it for the teacher. Id. at 1178.
113
Id. at 1179.
114
Id. at 1178.
115
Id. at 1177.
116
Id. at 1182.
117
Most likely, since the website did not cause the kind of interference that would
subject it to discipline under Tinker, the court declined to charter new territory regarding
the boundaries of in-school speech.
118
Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
119
Id. at 1089. The court observed that the site was created at home without the use of
school resources. Id.
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visitors to vote on who would “die” next. 120 The website was
featured on an evening television news story, which characterized
the site as promoting a “hit list.” 121 The next day, the school
principal placed Emmett on “emergency expulsion for
intimidation, harassment, [and] disruption to the educational
process.” 122 The court distinguished the case from both Fraser
and Kuhlmeier, emphasizing that Emmett’s website was far
removed from any school activity:
Plaintiff’s speech was not at a school assembly, as
in Fraser, and was not in a school-sponsored
newspaper, as in Kuhlmeier. It was not produced in
connection with any class or school project.
Although the intended audience was undoubtedly
connected to Kentlake High School, the speech was
entirely outside of the school’s supervision or
control. 123
The court, accordingly, held for Emmett, enjoining the school from
enforcing its suspension. 124
David Hudson argues that Emmett properly dismissed the
school’s arguments for discipline on grounds that the school lacked
supervision or control over the speech. 125 “Speech on a website
should be no different than if a student had a conversation with
other students off-campus about a school administrator.”126

120

Id.
Id. The phrase “hit list” appeared nowhere on the website. Id.
122
Id. The emergency expulsion was subsequently reduced to five days. Id.
123
Id. at 1090. Interestingly, the court could have analyzed this case under Kuhlmeier
because the website’s title, “Unofficial Kentlake High Home Page,” could “reasonably
[be] perceive[d] to bear the imprimatur of the school.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
124
Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
125
David Hudson, Censorship of Student Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing
Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 221
(2000).
126
Id.
121

VOL19_BOOK2_FRYMAN

2009]

2/18/2009 3:07:35 AM

STUDENT FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE

575

Aaron Caplan represented Emmett as a staff attorney for the
American Civil Liberties Union of Washington. 127 He argued that
schools lack jurisdiction to enforce off-campus behavior for the
same reason that “[j]udges would never find speakers in summary
contempt of court for disrespectful statements made outside the
courtroom.” 128 He further notes that “Internet technology is not
unique in its ability to penetrate school walls” 129 and offers the
following hypothetical situation:
Imagine a student who writes a letter to the editor of
the local newspaper, criticizing the principal in
language sufficiently vulgar to justify punishment
under [Bethel v. Fraser] if the letter had been read
aloud at a school assembly. The school could not
punish the student for expressing her views in the
free press. This would be true even if the school
library subscribes to the paper, the student knows
about the subscription, and she tells friends where
to find it in the school library’s copy. 130
Caplan concludes that “[t]he mere ability to access texts, sounds,
or images from within a school does not transform them into oncampus speech.” 131
Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea identifies five justifications
used to permit schools to restrict student-speech rights and argues
that none of them logically extend to restricting student digital
media. 132 The rationale used most frequently by courts is what
Papandrea calls “the so-called ‘special characteristics’ of the
elementary and secondary school environment.” 133 Courts should
defer to school administrators because “[t]he educational process
127

Caplan, supra note 20, at 93 n.*.
Id. at 143.
129
Id. at 158.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 159.
132
Papandrea, supra note 64, at 38.
133
Id. at 45 (“[T]he Court has . . . tended to rest its student-speech decisions on the socalled ‘special characteristics’ of the elementary and secondary school environment.”).
128
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requires quiet and order, and school officials . . . generally have to
make quick decisions about what to tolerate and what to
condemn.” 134 She argues that this justification has “little traction
outside of the classroom setting.” 135 She further notes that
“[g]iving broad deference to school officials to punish student
speech in the digital media would be tantamount to granting them
authority to censor the speech of adolescents generally.” 136
In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, 137 the court
dealt not with a student website, but rather with a controversial email that circulated around the school. 138 Plaintiff Zachariah Paul
compiled an offensive “Top Ten” list about the school athletic
director, Robert Bozzuto. 139 Paul composed the list “while at
home after school hours” and e-mailed it to his friends “from his
home computer.” 140 Weeks later, copies of the “Bozzuto Top Ten
list” were found in the teachers’ lounge. 141 The school suspended
Paul for ten days on grounds that “the list contained offensive
remarks about a school official, was found on school grounds, and
that Paul admitted creating the list.” 142
Plaintiffs argued “that a heightened standard applies because
the speech at issue occurred off school grounds.” 143 The court
responded that it “need not resolve [t]his issue [because] [t]he
overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed school speech
(whether on or off campus) in accordance with Tinker.” 144 This
statement is as striking as it is inaccurate. As demonstrated above,
134

Id.
Id. at 46.
136
Id.
137
Killion v. Franklin Regional Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
138
Id. at 448.
139
Id. The list contained derogatory references to Bozzuto’s appearance and the size of
his genitals. Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 448–49. The court noted that the e-mail was not distributed by Paul, but rather
by another “undisclosed” student. Id. at 449.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 455.
144
Id. (emphasis added).
135
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the Klein and Thomas courts both declined to apply Tinker because
the speech at issue was off-campus. 145 The dicta in Bystrom
stressed that the school’s discipline was constitutional only
because the newspaper was distributed on campus. 146 In Emmett,
the court similarly refused to apply Tinker or Kuhlmeier because
the website at issue was sufficiently distinct from school
activity. 147 Beussink is the only case that applied Tinker even
while stressing the off-campus nature of the speech at issue. Yet,
its authority is not overwhelming by any measure. Perhaps the
court’s sweeping statement may be better understood in light of its
holding that Paul’s suspension was indeed unconstitutional
because the school did not satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption
test. 148 The court added that the fact that the list was brought on
campus, even though it was not brought by Paul, was further
reason to apply Tinker. 149
Of all the online student speech cases, J.S. ex rel H.S. v.
Bethlehem Area School District provides the most extensive and
detailed analysis of legal issues involved in disciplining students
for speech originating off-campus. 150 Justin Swidler, referred to
by the court as J.S., 151 was an eighth grade student at Nitschmann
Middle School. 152 He created a website entitled “Teacher Sux.” 153
The site was made on his home computer and on his own time, not
part of a school project or sponsored by the School District. 154 On
the site, J.S. “made derogatory, profane, offensive and threatening
comments, primarily about the student’s algebra teacher, Mrs.
145

See supra text accompanying notes 69–84.
See supra text accompanying notes 86–90.
147
See supra text accompanying notes 119–24.
148
Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455. Had the court wished to rule against the plaintiffs,
one would expect a more nuanced discussion of the relevant case law.
149
Id.
150
Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 246–50.
151
See id. at 247 (referring to J.S. by his full name).
152
J.S., 807 A.2d at 850.
153
Id. at 851.
154
Id. at 850.
146
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Kathleen Fulmer and Nitschmann Middle School principal, Mr. A.
Thomas Kartsotis.” 155 The legally-minded middle schooler placed
a disclaimer at the outset. 156 By entering the site, the visitor
agreed that he or she was not a school staff member and that he or
she would not tell any employees of the school about the site. 157
The court discussed in great detail the many derogatory and
profanity-laced references to teachers. 158 “The most striking web
page,” the court observed, regarded J.S.’s algebra teacher, Mrs.
Fulmer. 159 The page’s caption read, “Why Should She Die?” and
directed the reader to “Take a look at the diagram and the reasons I
gave, then give me $20 to help pay for the hitman.” 160 Students,
faculty, and administrators eventually viewed the site and reported
it to Principal Kartsotis. 161 The principal believed the threats to be
serious and proceeded to contact police authorities and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. 162 Mrs. Fulmer testified that, as a result
of viewing the website, she “suffered stress, anxiety, loss of
appetite, loss of sleep, loss of weight, and a general sense of loss of
well being.” 163 Additionally, the website “had a demoralizing
impact on the school community.” 164 At the end of the school
year, the School District sent a letter to J.S. and his parents,
informing them that J.S. would be suspended. 165 The letter cited
155

Id. at 851.
Id.
157
Id. at 851. Despite J.S.’s intentions, the disclaimer did not prevent access to the site,
which was not password protected. Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 851–52. The court noted that J.S. had told other students about it. Id. at 852.
162
Id. at 852. The police confirmed the identity of J.S. but declined to file criminal
charges. Id.
163
Id. Mrs. Fulmer was prescribed anti-anxiety and anti-depression medication and
was unable to finish the school year. Id.
164
Id. Principal Kartsotis testified that the website’s effect “was comparable to the
death of a student or staff member.” Id.
165
Id. The suspension was originally three days and then extended to ten days. Shortly
thereafter, the school began expulsion proceedings. Id. By the time expulsions hearings
were conducted, J.S.’s parents had enrolled him in another school. Id. at 853.
156
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“threat to a teacher, harassment of a teacher and principal, and
disrespect to a teacher and principal.” 166
The court first considered the School District’s argument that
J.S.’s statements constituted a “true threat,” and thus would be
unprotected even outside a school setting. 167 The court rejected
this argument, finding that “the web site . . . was a sophomoric,
crude, highly offensive and perhaps misguided attempt at humor or
parody. However, it did not reflect a serious expression of intent
to inflict harm.” 168
Turning to a discussion of the seminal school free speech
cases, the court noted that the school setting is sui generis. 169 Its
“awesome charge” is to balance the constitutional rights of the
student with the preservation of order and a proper educational
environment. 170 The court recognized that applying the traditional
doctrine to the Internet is far more complicated. “First, a threshold
issue regarding the ‘location’ of the speech must be resolved to
determine if the unique concerns regarding the school environment
are even implicated, i.e., is it on campus speech or purely offcampus speech?” 171 It is this “threshold issue” that is at the core of
all the cases discussed in this section. 172
The court found that there was “a sufficient nexus between the
web site and the school campus to consider the speech as occurring
on-campus.” 173 One can discern three distinct facts that the court
considered in its discussion: (1) J.S. “facilitated the on-campus
nature of the speech” by accessing the website at school and
showing it to fellow students; 174 (2) the website targeted a school
166

Id. at 852.
Id. at 856.
168
Id. at 859.
169
Id. at 855.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 864 (“Tinker’s simple armband . . . has been replaced by J.S.’s complex
multimedia web site, accessible to fellow students, teachers, and the world.”).
172
Id.
173
Id. at 865.
174
Id.
167
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audience; 175 and (3) since the algebra teacher and principal were
featured prominently on the site, “it was inevitable that the
contents of the web site would pass from students to teachers,
inspiring circulation of the web page on school property.” 176 The
court summarized its holding as follows: “[W]here speech that is
aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto the
school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech
will be considered on-campus speech.” 177 Having established that
J.S.’s speech occurred on-campus for First Amendment purposes,
the court then applied the traditional free-speech cases. 178 It
concluded that “the web site created disorder and significantly and
adversely impacted the delivery of instruction.” 179 The school
successfully demonstrated that the site “created an actual and
substantial interference with the work of the school” to satisfy the
Supreme Court standard under Tinker. 180
Professor Clay Calvert argues that the J.S. court’s application
of Tinker is too broad. 181 Suppose a student’s mother creates a
website similar to the one created by J.S.:
The site does not make any true threats of violence,
but rather calls the teachers, among other things,
“morons” who “clearly have no clue about
teaching.” The site includes photographs of certain
teachers morphing into Adolph Hitler. The page, in
other words, is very similar to some of the Web
sites created today by minors off campus that attack
school personnel.

175

Id. Compare id. with Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (“Although the intended audience was undoubtedly connected to
Kentlake High School, the speech was entirely outside of the school’s supervision or
control.”).
176
J.S., 807 A.2d at 865.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 865–69.
179
Id. at 869.
180
Id.
181
Calvert, supra note 150, at 280–82.

VOL19_BOOK2_FRYMAN

2009]

2/18/2009 3:07:35 AM

STUDENT FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE

581

....
Would the school be able to punish the mother for
her speech? The answer, of course, is no. 182
Calvert argues that just because the student spends a large part of
his day on school grounds while his mother does not, should not
afford schools additional jurisdiction. 183
The J.S. decision should be considered side-by-side with
Layshock, a case that applied a similar analysis but arrived at a
different conclusion. 184 Plaintiff Justin Layshock created a parody
profile of his high school principal, Eric Trosch, 185 using the
website MySpace. 186 As the court explained, “MySpace has a
template for user profiles, which allows website users to fill in
background information and include answers to specific
questions.” 187 Layshock answered the questions, impersonating
Principal Trosch. 188 The profile contained “nonsensical answers to
silly questions” and “crude juvenile language.” 189 When the
profile was discovered, the school administrators unsuccessfully
sought to block access to the site. 190 They also directed teachers to
not permit students to use computers in the classroom. 191 After an
informal hearing, Layshock was suspended for ten days.

182

Id. at 281.
Id.
184
See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007), appeal
denied, 2007 WL 3120192 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2007).
185
Id. at 591.
186
MySpace, http://myspace.com. The court described it as “a very popular Internet
site where users can share photos, journals, personal interests, and the like with other
users of the Internet.” Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
187
Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
188
Id.
189
Id. At some later point, three other unflattering profiles of the principal appeared on
MySpace, and the school admitted that it could not directly attribute which profile caused
the cited disruption. Id. at 591, 593. Layshock, though, did admit to creating one
MySpace profile. Id. at 591.
190
Id. at 592.
191
School officials then contacted MySpace directly and the profiles were disabled. Id.
183
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The court observed that the profile was created outside of
school and not during school hours. 192 Layshock, however,
“engaged in some limited conduct related to the profile while in
school,” such as accessing the profile and showing it to
classmates. 193 There was also evidence that it was viewed by other
students in school, which caused disruption. 194 The school’s
technology coordinator testified that he “spent approximately 25%
of his time that week on issues related to the profiles.” 195
Following J.S., the court first addressed the difficult “threshold
issue” of whether Layshock’s speech occurred on campus.196 “The
mere fact that the [I]nternet may be accessed at school,” the court
reasoned, “does not authorize school officials to become censors of
the world-wide web.” 197 The court quoted approvingly from
Thomas, noting that when “school officials venture[] out of the
school
yard
and
into
the
general
community
. . . their actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind
government officials in the public arena.” 198 The court noted,
however, that Thomas did not address the scenario of students
causing “substantial disruption” within the school by actions
originating outside the school. 199 And this was the scenario at
issue here.
The court then turned to the lengthy discussion of J.S., which it
acknowledged as “an analogous case.” 200 Although it considered
the case on point, it “respectfully reach[ed] a slightly different
192
Id. at 591. Although the court stated that “[n]o school resources were used to create
the profile,” Layshock did use a photograph of Trosch that he copied from the school’s
website. Id.
193
Id. at 591.
194
Id. at 592. A teacher testified that he “observed students congregating and giggling
in his computer lab class,” while looking at Layshock’s profile. Id.
195
Id. at 593.
196
Id. at 597.
197
Id. The court stressed that schools must share their supervisory responsibilities with
“families, churches, community organizations and the judicial system.” Id.
198
Id. at 598.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 601–02.
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balance between student expression and school authority.” 201 The
school failed to “establish[] a sufficient nexus between Justin
[Layshock]’s speech and a substantial disruption of the school
environment.” 202
The relationship between the off-campus
conduct and any disruption in school was too attenuated for
application of the Tinker test. 203
It is important to recognize one analytical difference between
J.S. and Layshock. J.S.’s “sufficient nexus” was between the offcampus activity and the school. 204 In Layshock, it was between the
off-campus activity and the disruption. 205 This difference will be
addressed in a later section.
Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School
District 206 involved another eighth grader, Aaron Wisniewski, who
created an offensive America Online (“AOL”) Instant Messenger
(“IM”) “buddy icon.” 207 The icon featured “a small drawing of a
pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head.” 208 Beneath it appeared
the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” the student’s English
teacher. 209 “Aaron sent IM messages displaying the icon to some
15 members of his IM ‘buddy list.’” 210 The icon could be viewed
by members of Wisniewski’s buddy list, some of whom were
students at the school, for three weeks. 211 During that time,
another student informed VanderMolen of the offending icon, who

201

Id. at 602.
Id. at 600. Note the similar phraseology used in J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area
School District, 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002). See supra note 174 and accompanying
text.
203
Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
204
J.S., 807 A.2d at 851.
205
Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
206
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Ed. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008).
207
Id. at 35–36. The court explained that a user’s buddy icon, or “IM icon,” is on
display whenever the user sends or receives an instant message. Id.
208
Id. at 36.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
202
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in turn forwarded it to the principal. 212 Aaron was suspended for
five days. 213
The Second Circuit conceded that “some courts have assessed
a student’s statements concerning the killing of a school official
. . . against the true ‘threat’ standard of Watts.” 214 In this case,
however, the court wished to go further. “School officials,” it
stated, “have significantly broader authority to sanction student
speech than the Watts standard allows.” 215 The Tinker standard
applied here. 216 As to the issue of Aaron’s off-campus conduct,
the court said the following: “The fact that Aaron’s creation and
transmission of the IM icon occurred away from school property
does not necessarily insulate him from school discipline.” 217
Citing the hypothetical scenario envisioned by the same court in
Thomas, 218 the court recognized that “off-campus conduct can
create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a
school.” 219 It found that indeed “it was reasonably foreseeable that
the IM icon would come to the attention of school authorities and
the teacher whom the icon depicted being shot.” 220

212

Id.
Id. The principal informed local police but an investigator concluded “that the icon
was meant as a joke” and that “Aaron posed no real threat to VanderMolen.” Id. Pending
criminal charges were dropped. Id.
214
Id. at 38; see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding that speech
constituting a “true ‘threat’” is unprotected by the First Amendment).
215
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38.
216
Id.; see also supra Part I.A.
217
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39.
218
Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir.
1979) (“We can, of course, envision a case in which a group of students incite substantial
disruption within the school from some remote locale.”).
219
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39.
220
Id. The panel was divided as to whether the test is reasonable foreseeability or
whether it is sufficient that, on the undisputed facts here, the icon reached school
grounds. Id. For an application of Wisniewski, see Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d
Cir. 2008).
213
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III. DISCUSSION
A. The Case for a “Sufficient Nexus” Standard
This section argues that that the J.S. and Layshock Courts offer
the appropriate balance between free speech protection and “the
special characteristics of the school environment.” 221 The court in
Emmett, declining to apply Tinker because the speech occurred
without school supervision, fails to provide schools with adequate
tools for disciplining truly materially and disruptive behavior. The
Wisniewski Court’s reasonable foreseeability test went too far in
the other direction and would effectively subject all student online
speech to the Tinker test. Any website, blog, Facebook or
MySpace page, and even an e-mail can foreseeably be accessed on
school grounds.
The United States Supreme Court may have avoided weighing
in on the standard for what constitutes on-campus speech for First
Amendment purposes.
It has, however, been generous in
explaining why student speech may be regulated more strictly than
speech generally. In this area, the Court’s dicta in its seminal
student-speech cases may shed light on this difficult and thorny
issue. In Tinker, the Court stated that student conduct that
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder” is
not protected. 222 The First Amendment, the Court explained, must
be applied “in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.” 223 In Fraser, the Court elaborated further: schools
may impart fundamental values that are “essential to a democratic
society.” 224 Student conduct that undermines a school’s ability to
conduct its legitimate function is problematic and may therefore be
regulated under certain circumstances. 225 It is true that these

221
222
223
224
225

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
Id. at 513.
Id. at 506.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
See id.
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statements are dicta but they reflect the values underlying the
Court’s various modes of analysis.
Let us step back momentarily and ask why student speech
should be subject to censorship at all; the Court answers in a clear
voice. Schools have a state-recognized task, and conduct that
fundamentally undermines that task is subject to a stricter level of
scrutiny than the First Amendment generally permits. Some courts
and commentators assume that the student speech restrictions stem
from the special characteristics of the physical school grounds. 226
Based on the Supreme Court’s characterization of public education
in developing its doctrine, however, it appears that the special
standard used to analyze student speech stems from the school’s
unique educational role. The question before courts in student
online speech cases, then, is not whether to extend school authority
to censor student speech beyond the school grounds, but whether it
makes sense to limit that authority to the physical school grounds
in the first place.
The facts of J.S. suggest the strongest argument for its
approach. There, a middle-school student’s off-campus activity
indeed caused substantial and material disruption on campus. Had
J.S.’s medium been the kind of underground newspaper at issue in
Thomas and Bystrom, Tinker would apply when the newspaper was
brought on campus. But here, J.S.’s speech was brought on
campus by the very nature of its medium. The Internet made it
immediately accessible from school computers and personal
computers using school-supplied Internet access. The court, in
struggling with this fact, articulated a standard that would allow
the school to restrict speech like J.S.’s while still protecting speech
that truly has nothing to do with school.
Calvert’s argument that the J.S. Court’s analysis would, if
carried to its logical conclusion, punish the parent of a student who
creates a similar website is flawed. It fails to appreciate that, even
if a student is punished for off-campus behavior, the disciplinary
226

See supra Part III.B.
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measures available to the school are limited to school property.
The school cannot punish a student qua citizen for any speech
under Tinker! It may only punish him qua student, i.e. by
suspension, denial of school privileges, etc. If a student can be
punished only in his capacity as a student, then it is perfectly
reasonable that the school cannot extend punishment to his mother,
even for the identical speech.
The Emmett court’s approach, advocated by Hudson and
Caplan, fails to adequately address the dilemma faced by
Nitschmann Middle School. The damage caused by J.S.’s website
demonstrates that Internet speech is different than an off-campus
conversation among classmates in a fundamental way. An offcampus conversation is not instantaneously broadcast inside the
school walls. A more apt metaphor for Internet speech is an offcampus conversation in which all students, teachers, and
administrators, are invited to listen simply by visiting a website.
Internet speech is not private speech the way that a conversation
between schoolmates is and, thus, should not be treated similarly
under the law.
Suppose a student makes a statement off-campus, in a
conversation with a friend, that would be subject to discipline had
it been uttered in the school cafeteria. The school rightly may not
take action even if the controversial statement is discussed and
repeated by others in school. If the student, though, repeated his
statement in school and it caused material and substantial
disruption, he or she would be subject to discipline. Online speech
is analogous, not to a conversation between friends off-campus,
but rather to a student repeating his statement in school. The
website itself, which may be viewed by others on school property,
is the original speech. When others access it at the school library,
it is as though the student is speaking repeatedly. Indeed, this is
one of the major attractions of expressing oneself online. It allows
one’s words and images to be viewed in their original format by a
wide audience.
In this light, Professor Papandrea’s notion of what constitutes
the classroom setting is overly narrow. It fails to appreciate that
speech originating off-campus, such as Internet speech, can disrupt
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the order and discipline required of the classroom setting. She
correctly points out that “digital speech is generally nowhere and
everywhere at the same time.” 227 To a large extent, then, limiting
school authority to speech uttered within schools, as Papandrea
urges, 228 is somewhat arbitrary. In today’s wired culture, digital
speech is equally capable of causing disruption.
The argument that the deference afforded to schools by J.S. and
Layshock is “tantamount to granting them authority to censor the
speech of adolescents generally” 229 is aimed at the wrong target.
Obviously, expanding the boundaries of the school effectively
allows for greater censorship. However, the school boundaries
should not be determined by how much censorship is too much, but
rather by what justifies that censorship. Online speech is
sufficiently similar to speech taking place physically on-campus to
warrant an analogous treatment under the law. If the fear is that
juvenile speech is not sufficiently protected, the response should be
to alter how Tinker and Fraser are applied. It is Tinker, Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse that restrict student speech, not J.S. and
Layshock. In the Internet Age, it seems increasingly arbitrary to
grant schools authority to regulate certain speech but only if it
physically occurs on campus.
Caplan’s analogy to a judge finding somebody in contempt of
court for offensive statements made outside the courtroom is
imprecise. 230 Judges and schools regulate certain speech for
fundamentally different reasons. In a courtroom it is indeed the
physical location of the offending speech that warrants contempt.
The same speech outside of court, no matter how offensive and
inappropriate, could not have the same effect as the speech uttered
ten feet before the judge. Regarding student Internet speech, this is
simply not the case. Once again, consider the facts of J.S.
227

Papandrea, supra note 64.
Id. at 47 (“[C]ourts should continue to declare that speech that lacks any sort of
physical connection to the school should fall outside of its jurisdiction.”) (emphasis
added).
229
Id. at 46.
230
Caplan, supra note 20, at 143; supra text accompanying note 128.
228
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Caplan’s and Papandrea’s insistence on limiting Tinker to speech
physically uttered on school grounds would render schools
impotent to deal with students like J.S. It is not difficult to
imagine how students like J.S. could cause substantial and material
disruption in school without uttering a word on school property.
Suppose a tenth-grade student creates a website supporting his
candidacy for school-wide office. On the site, he trashes his
opponents with racist, anti-gay, anti-Semitic rhetoric. So long as
he falls short of Watts’s “true threat” standard, according to
Caplan, Papandrea, and Emmett, the school can do nothing to
discipline him even if his vile remarks cause heated outbursts
during class or worse, minority students to stay home out of fear.
B. A Suggested Analysis
The J.S. court considered three factors in determining whether
the speech at issue was on-campus for purposes of applying
Tinker: (1) whether J.S. accessed the site at school; (2) whether the
site targeted a school audience; and (3) whether it was inevitable
that the site would be circulated on school grounds. 231 J.S.’s
website was about school, it was directed at his fellow students,
and it was bound to end up on-campus. That, the court properly
reasoned, is on-campus speech.
Layshock’s discussion of a sufficient nexus between the online
activity and the substantial and material disruption adds an
important, albeit subtle, wrinkle to J.S.’s test. When speech
physically occurs on campus, it is subject to Tinker and Fraser.
According to J.S., when online speech is sufficiently directed
toward school, it may be considered on-campus speech. 232
Layshock adds an additional requirement. 233 When online speech
is rendered on-campus by a sufficient nexus between it and the
231

J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002). Note
the difference between J.S.’s inevitability and Wisniewski’s foreseeability. See
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008).
232
See J.S., 807 A.2d at 865.
233
See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
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school, the entire online speech is not, ipso facto, subject to oncampus speech standards. The specific aspect of the speech that is
linked to the material and substantial disruption must be
sufficiently directed towards the school. Consider a student
website that parodies the school gym teacher. Suppose, in the
course of his parody, the student makes racist remarks, which in
turn cause the kind of substantial disruption that could be regulated
under Tinker. To discipline this student, the school would be
required to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between his or her oncampus speech, i.e., the parody, and the disruption. Indeed, if the
racist remarks are part of the parody, then the school would
probably meet this burden. However, the court should be careful
not to render an entire website on-campus speech merely because
of one aspect. A student who writes one blog entry about the
school baseball team should not be disciplined when he expresses
admiration for Adolf Hitler in another. Layshock requires the
school wishing to discipline the student to demonstrate a sufficient
nexus between the on-campus nature of the speech and the alleged
disruption. 234 Both J.S. and Layshock’s tests are necessary to
appropriately balance students’ First Amendment rights with the
unique requirements of the school setting.
It is not entirely clear that the Layshock Court consciously
adjusted J.S.’s test in this way. It certainly did not do so explicitly.
However, the purpose here is not to analyze these cases for their
own sake, but rather with an eye toward developing a legal
standard for online student speech. Based on this Note’s author’s
reading of both J.S. and Layshock, the following analysis is
suggested. First, courts should consider (a) whether the website in
question was created or accessed by the author at school; and (b)
whether the author encouraged fellow students to view the site. A
student who makes no effort to disseminate his or her speech at
school or among fellow students should not be held to student-

234

Id. at 599.

VOL19_BOOK2_FRYMAN

2009]

2/18/2009 3:07:35 AM

STUDENT FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE

591

speech standards regarding First Amendment protection. 235
Second, the speech must target a school audience. Third, the
particular speech to be analyzed under Tinker or Fraser must itself
meet the first two requirements.
CONCLUSION
There is a clear tension between wanting to promote
freedom of expression in schools and maintaining the discipline
required for their educational responsibilities. A standard that
properly balances students’ rights with the unique setting of the
school is required. In arguing for the analysis used in J.S. and
Layshock, this Note’s author does not purport to provide courts
with a comprehensive standard with which to tackle the First
Amendment issues in student online speech cases. Like any legal
standard in constitutional law, the nuances must be ironed out over
time as courts have the opportunity to consider a wide variety of
factual circumstances. Rather, this Note’s suggested analysis is
offered as a starting place.

235

This incorporates J.S.’s discussion of whether the site would inevitably end up on
campus. See J.S., 807 A.2d at 865. It should be within a student’s control to withhold his
or her speech from school.

